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Selasa, 06 November 2012

Where Do Hypotheses Come From?



Where Do Hypotheses Come From?

WE ALL MAKE THEM
 In this chapter we turn to the question, where do we get scientific hypotheses? The way the question is phrased may be misleading. Put this way, it gives the impression that forming hypotheses is something, unique to scientific activity. However, if we understand a hypothesis as the perception .of some pattern in phenomena, the establishment of some expectation as to what will happen next, we realize that "forming hypotheses" is something we do, all the time and have been doing since birth. We are by nature hypothesis formers. At what age our practice of interpreting, the World in such structured terms begins is not known, but long before we learn to talk in sentences we have already gone far beyond the raw impressions given us by our senses. We organize things coherently into such concepts as "mother," "father," "food," and "doggy," each of which implies a whole complex set of recognitions and expectations. We are not normally aware of how much of what we "see" is seen' by inference and memory rather than with just our eyes. But there are occasions when this is brought home to us, as we discussed in Chapter 2, by. the study of the kinds of optical illusions favored by psychologists and the puzzle pages of newspapers, by encounters with people of different cultures, by occasions where something radically unexpected happens when, in the graphic but hackneyed phrase, "our whole world collapses about us."
In making the statement that what we perceive as reality is actually
Hypothesis, the result of a culturally and personally determined interaction between ourselves and what is out there, we are not arguing that there is a discrepancy between "reality and what we think is reality. Rather we are saying there is no reality different from our perceptions of it. We cannot adopt a critical attitude toward everything we think we know; we couldn't function in the world if we did. But it is not surpris­ing that, even in situations where some serious discordance has ap­peared between our expectations and what actually happens, we should cling to the ways of thinking and perceiving that we are used to. The discovery of new hypotheses in science or in daily life is difficult because it is not so much a question of finding a new pattern where none was previously seen but rather of replacing a pattern we are used to-so used to that we take for granted that it is really there-by a new one. The point was put very well by Josh Billings: -"It aint ignorance that hurts us, it's what we know that aint so!"(1)
We are not trying to suggest that conservatism in ideas is wrong. It is impossible to subject everything we believe to doubt, and it is reason­able, when faced with new problems, to try to cope with them by the methods we have found to work with old ones. Since not all problems have easy answers, we would be foolish to assume that because our accustomed methods don't seem to work right off the bat they must be wrong and should be discarded.
Today we "know" that the world is round. But we should be sym­pathetic to our ancestors who refused to believe it. It flies in the face of common sense: a wealth of experience with falling off of things like trees, rocks, and steep hills tells us that if the world were round one would fall off the other side. We know better now, because we have been taught differently, but the first men to conjecture that the world might be round did not have this advantage. They had to make an imaginative leap beyond the "facts" known by everyone, and see things in a completely new way. Even today, a child told for the first time that the world is round is startled and skeptical.
Because scientific discovery has this character, one should not be surprised to learn that it is not a routine, mechanical process but rather one in which the subconscious mind plays a part (as it does in artistic creativity, also) and that chance and circumstance contribute. There is a popular but completely misleading belief about scientific discovery, that it is an orderly process in which facts are patiently gathered and neatly arranged, at which time the scientist sits down and contemplates them until some new pattern emerges. One can contrast this tidy picture with a quotation we have given earlier from the chemist Kekule describing the dreamlike reverie during which the dancing images of the atoms ,images, of course, arising from his own unconscious mind-forced the new concept into conscious awareness
THE MOMENT OF INSIGHT
Figure 21..
The act of discovery as a flash of insight rather than the patient
Assembling of the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle is shown beautifully by the following episode, described by the psychologist W. Kohler (2):
Nueva [a young female chimpanzee] was tested 3 days after her arrival. ... She had not yet made the acquaintance of the other animals but re­mained isolated in a cage. A little stick is introduced into her cage; she scrapes the ground with it, pushes the banana skins together in a heap, and then carelessly drops the stick at a distance of about three-quarters of a metre from the bars. Ten minutes later, fruit is placed outside the cage beyond her reach. She grasps at it, vainly of course, and then begins the characteristic complaint of the chimpanzee; she thrusts both lips­ especially the lower-forward, for a couple of inches, gazes imploringly at the observer, utters whimpering sounds, and finally flings herself on to the ground on her back-a gesture most eloquent of despair, which may

be observed on other occasions as well. Thus, between lamentations and entreaties, some time passes, until--about seven minutes after the fruit has been exhibited to her-she-suddenly casts a look at the stick, ceases her moaning, seizes the stick, stretches it out of the cage, and succeeds, though somewhat clumsily, in drawing the bananas within arm's length. Moreover, Nueva at once puts the end of her stick behind and beyond her objective. The test is repeated after an hour's interval; on this second occasion, the animal has recourse to the stick much sooner, and uses it with more skill; and at a third repetition, the stick is used immediately, as on all subsequent occasions. (pp. 32-33)

Another example of the role of the unconscious mind in discovery is given in a description by the French mathematician Poincare of his dis­coveries of some new lasses of mathematical functions and their prop­erties. One does not need to understand "Fuchsian functions" or other mathematical terms used by Poincare to appreciate his story (3):
It is time to penetrate deeper and to see what goes on in the very soul of the mathematician. For this, I believe, I can do best by recalling memories of my own. But I shall limit myself to telling how I wrote my first memoir on Fuchsian functions. I beg the reader's pardon; I am about to use some technical expressions, but they need not frighten him, for he is not obliged to understand them. I shall say, for example, that I have found the demon­stration of such a theorem under such circumstances. This theorem will have a barbarous name, unfamiliar to many, but that is unimportant, what is of interest for the psychologist is not the theorem but the circum­stances.
For fifteen days I strove to prove that there could not be any functions like those I have since called Fuchsian functions. I was then very ignorant; every day I seated myself at my work table, stayed an hour or two, tried a great number of combinations and reached no results. One evening, con­trary to my custom, I drank black coffee and could not sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs interlocked, so to speak, making a
Stable combinations. By the next morning i had established the existence of-­a class of Fuchsian functions, those which come from the hyper geometric series; I had only to write out the results, which took but a few hours....
Just at this time I left Caen, where I was then living, to go on a geologic excursion under the auspices of the school of mines. The changes of travel made me forget my mathematical work. Having reached Courtances, we entered an omnibus to go some place or other. At the moment when I put my foot on the step the idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it, that the trans­formations I. had used to define the Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidean geometry. I did not verify the idea, I should not have had, time. as, upon taking my seat in the omnibus, I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect certainty. On my return to Caen, for conscience's sake I verified the result at my leisure... (pp. 52-55)
POETRY ALSO
The similarity of the process to other creative activities, such as the writing of poetry, is shown by this quotation from A. E. Houseman(4):
In short I think that the production of poetry, in its first stage, is less an active than a passive and involuntary process; and if I were obliged, not to define poetry, but to name the class of things to which it belongs, I should call it a secretion; whether a natural secretion, like turpentine in the fir, or a morbid secretion, like the pearl in the oyster. I think that my own case, though I may not deal with the material so cleverly as the oyster does, is the latter, because I have seldom written poetry unless I was rather out of health, and the experience, though pleasurable, was generally agitating and exhausting. If only that you may, know what to avoid, I will give some account of the process.
Having drunk a pint of beer at luncheon-beer is a sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least intellectual portion of my life--I would go out for a walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me and following the progress of the seasons, there would flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once, accompanied, not preceded, by a vague notion of the poem which they were destined to form part of. Then there would usually be a lull of an hour or so, then perhaps the spring would bubble up again. I say bubble up, because so far as I could make out, the source of the suggestions thus proffered to the brain was an abyss which I have already had occasion to mention, the pit of the stomach. When I got home I wrote them down, leaving gaps, and hoping that further inspiration might be forthcoming another day. Sometimes it was, if I took my walks in a recep­tive and expectant frame of mind; but sometimes the poem had to be taken in hand and completed by the brain, which was apt to be a matter of trouble and anxiety, involving trial and disappointment, and sometimes ending in failure. I happen to remember distinctly the genesis of the piece which stands last in my first volume. Two of the stanzas, I do not say which, came into my head, just as they are printed, while I was crossing the comer of Hampstead Heath between Spaniard's Inn and the footpath to Temple Fortune. A third stanza came with a little coaxing after tea. One more was needed, but it did not come: I had to turn to and compose it myself, and that was a laborious business. I wrote it thirteen times, and it was more than a twelvemonth before I got it right. (pp. 47-50)

FOLK WISDOM
Not all discoveries have arisen unexpectedly out of the subcon­scious of the discoverers. There are a number of examples where ideas were in the air, so to speak, or present in the form of folk beliefs. The achievement of the discoverer was to take them seriously and think of ways to test them experimentally. Snow was not the first to think of the water supply as a mode of transmission of cholera: he states in his book that a number of people had suggested this possibility, some of whom were professionals actively concerned with finding the cause of the dis­ease and others just ordinary people expressing a conviction they de­rived from their own experiences. Snow's genius was to think of exper­iments that could prove it.
Jenner learned the idea that the mild disease of cowpox might con­fer immunity against smallpox from the milkmaids who often caught cowpox from the cows they milked. Jenner took this apparent supersti­tion of uneducated people seriously enough to test it, even though it required taking the risk of deliberately infecting people with a disease in the hope of preventing a more serious one. He had to fight violent opposition in his program: there are contemporary cartoons showing people growing cow's heads (see Figure 22) from their shoulders at the site of the inoculation.
Figure 22
FIGURE 22. The Cow Pock." Etching by James Gillray, 1802. The physidan performing the vaccination is a portrait of Jenner. (From the Smith, Kline, and French Laboratories collection of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, and repro­duced with the permission of the Museum.) One of the first conclusive demonstrations that the bite of an insect is capable of transmitting disease was by Theobald Smith and E. L. Kilborne in the case of Texas cattle fever in 1893. This work led to the identification of insect transmission of such diseases as malaria, bubonic plague, and yellow fever. Smith and Kilborne did not make the hypothesis themselves that the ticks that bite the cows transmit the disease; it was the cattle ranchers that concluded this. They had noticed a relation between the onset of tick infestations and the appearance of the disease in their cattle.(6)

CHANCE
Sometimes, although more rarely than one might think, discoveries
are made by accident. The following is an example reported by A. V. Nalbandov(7):
In 1940 I became interested in the effects of hypophysectomy of chickens. After I had mastered the surgical technique my birds continued to die and within a few weeks after the operation none remained alive. Neither re­placement therapy nor any other precautions taken helped and I was about ready to agree with A. S. Parkes and R. T. Hill who had done similar operations _in_ England, that hypophysectomized chickens simply cannot live. I resigned myself to doing a few short-term experiments and drop­ping the whole project when suddenly 98% of a group of hypophysectornized birds survived for 3 weeks and a great many lived for as long as 6 months. The only explanation I could find was that my surgical technique had improved with practice. At about this time, and when I was ready to start a long-term experiment, the birds again started dying and within a week both recently operated birds and those which had lived for several months were dead. This, of course, argued against surgical proficiency. I continued with the project since i now knew  that they could live under some circumstances which, however, eluded me completely. At about this time I had a second successful period during which mortality was very low. But, despite careful analysis of records (the possibility of disease and many other factors were considered and eliminated) no explanation was apparent. You can imagine how frustrating it was to be unable to take advantage of something that was obviously having a profound effect on the ability of these animals to withstand the operation. Late one night I was driving home from a party via a road which passes the laboratory. Even though it was 2 A.M. lights were burning in the animal rooms. I thought that a careless student had left them on so I stopped to turn them off. A few nights later I noted again that lights had been left on all night. Upon enquiry it turned out that a substitute janitor, whose job it was to make sure at midnight that all the windows were closed and doors locked, preferred to leave on the lights in the animal room in order to be able to find the exit door (the light switches not being near the door). Further


checking showed that the two survival periods coincided with the times when the substitute janitor was on the job. Controlled experiments soon
showed that hypophysectomized chickens kept in darkness all died while chickens lighted for 2 one-hour periods nightly lived indefinitely. The
explanation was that birds in the dark do not eat and develop hypo­glycaemia from which they cannot recover, while birds which are lighted
eat enough to prevent hypoglycaemia. Since that time we no longer experience any trouble in maintaining hypophysectomized birds for as long as we wish. (pp. 167-168)

Accident also played a part in Semmeiweis's discovery that puer­peral fever-childbed fever-which killed thousands of women during childbirth in hospitals in the nineteenth century, was transmitted by the hands of the doctors. These doctors, who had previously examined women already sick with the disease or who had performed autopsies on fatal cases, in accord with the practice of the time had washed but not disinfected their hands. Semmelweis made this discovery when he rec­ognized symptoms similar to childbed fever in a physician friend of his who died of "blood poisoning" contracted from a scalpel wound in­curred while performing an autopsy(5).

However, the role of chance in discovery is only part of the story the discoverer usually plays an active rather than a passive role: he must recognize the significance of a chance event that most others would ignore. There is a famous quotation from Pasteur which sums this up: "Chance favors the prepared mind." Sir Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin from his observation that bacterial cultures on petri dishes were killed in the vicinity of mold colonies that formed accidentally on the nutrient medium. Prior to Fleming's work, this observation had been made thousands of times in bacteriological laboratories. The response had been to throw the mold-infected cultures out because they were no longer any good for growing bacteria.

THE LOST KEYS
These stories of scientific discovery may remind the reader of such common experiences as misplacing the car keys and searching the house for an hour in mounting frustration, finally giving up in disgust and going to work, where one suddenly remembers, 2 hours later, while absorbed in some detail of the job, that one left them on the shelf in the kitchen while drinking a second cup of coffee. Of course, sometimes the frantic search succeeds, and sometimes the keys are never found at all.


THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

The above examples of the importance of the unconscious in dis­covery may give the impression that discovery itself is a very chancy business-a matter of having a person with the right unconscious mind in the right place at the right time. It may seem like a miracle that anything has been discovered at all.
But our unconscious minds are not that independent of our envi­ronments. Scientists share the broader culture of their society as well as the subculture of their own field, and through these are exposed to all sorts of influences and suggestions. They have been trained by senior members of their professions; they attend lectures, have private dis­cussions with their colleagues, read papers and books, and so Forth. It is trite to say that any individual is unique, but it is necessary to recognize how much each person shares with the community. It is hard to document the many ways in which one's ideas may be influenced or suggested by the ideas of others, but it is a. common experience in science and in life to pick up ideas from others and without deliberate dishonesty come to believe that one thought of them oneself.
There have been many remarkable examples in the history of sci­ence where important discoveries were made almost simultaneously and independently by several scientists. Newton and Leibniz both in­vented the calculus at about the same time, and disputed for the rest of their lives about who deserved credit for the discovery. In retrospect, the time must have been ripe for the calculus to be discovered, although it would require a careful historical study of the development of mathematics in the seventeenth century to show this. This does not imply that it did not require genius to make the discovery at that moment, but only that a century earlier not even a Newton or a Leibniz-could have done it, and by a century later, even in their absence, the calculus would have been gradually developed by the efforts of many lesser mathe­maticians.
Something similar happened in biology. Gregor Mendel published a paper in 1865 describing certain laws of heredity that he had discov­ered; his work was ignored until 1900, when the same laws were redis­covered simultaneously by three different groups of scientists. Again, we can conclude that in 1900 the time was ripe for the acceptance of these laws: biology had advanced in the 35 years from 1865 to 1900 in ways that made the subculture of biologists both more likely to discover them and more willing to accept them.


THE TACTICS OF SCIENCE

The examples quoted above may give a misleading impression about scientffic discovery in general. Poincare studying the problem of Fuchsian functions, Nalbandov trying to keep alive chicks whose pituitary glands had been removed, and Theobold Smith working on Texas cattle fever were scientists struggling with a problem and suddenly breaking through to a solution.

Many scientific discoveries are made this way, but many are not. This may sound paradoxical: how can you solve problems without struggling with them? But science does not always progress by deliber­ate and direct ways. P.B. Medawar uses a very appropriate military metaphor: problems do not always yield to direct assault, sometimes they are solved by attrition, and sometimes they are outflanked.(8) Dis­coveries are often made and problems solved in completely unexpected ways, by achievements in other fields that seem to have no connection whatever with the problem at hand. It was not a biologist, a doctor, or an astronomer who invented the microscope or the telescope, but grin­ders of lenses, who as far as we know were motivated only by idle curiosity or the desire for amusement. But biology, medicine, and as­tronomy were revolutionized by these inventions.
The laws of Newton described very accurately the motions of all the planets in their orbits around the sun except for Mercury, which showed certain slight deviations. Astronomers struggled with the problem for years, proposing many hypotheses in an attempt to show that if New­ton's laws were properly applied the discrepancies could be explained. None worked. Einstein, working on a completely different problem arising from certain peculiarities of the transmission of electromagnetic waves, was led to new laws of physics that replaced Newton’s and explained the misbehavior of Mercury.
So it must be acknowledged that, to make scientific discoveries, both genius and patient hard work are useful, but neither is any guaran­tee of success. There is something about discovery that cannot be pro­grammed.

It is this unpredictable character that makes it hard to know how to proceed, when aced with some deeply felt need. We want to cure or, better still, prevent cancer, how do we go about it? We can try to im­prove the tools at hand: better methods of surgery or radiation treat­ment, earlier diagnosis, new drugs, a search for possible environmental agents. But none of these may turn out to provide a real solution. More fundamental understanding of cell biology may provide an answer, or it


may come unexpectedly from completely unrelated areas: research on hay fever, insecticides, or abnormal psychology.
Choosing a problem and deciding how to go about solving it are
Difficult. It isn't enough that the problem should be important- it may not be solvable at the time, or by the tactics proposed. Medawar has put it as follows (8):
No scientist is admired for failing in the attempt to solve problems that lie beyond his competence. The most he can hope for is the kindly contempt earned by the Utopian politician. If politics is the art of the possible, research is surely the art of the soluble. Both are immensely practical minded affairs. (p. 97)

REFERENCE NOTES
1. This quotation is apparently a paraphrase of Billings, who actually said: "It is better tew know nothing than tew know what aint so." We copied it when we saw it quoted somewhere we have lost track of. It is phrased better that way for our purpose than the way Billings actually put it.
2. W. Kohler, The Mentality of Apes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1927 (reissued
1973). Reprinted with the permission of Routledge & Kegan Paul.
3. Henri Poincare, Science and Method, Dover Publications, New York, undated.
4. A. E. Houseman, The Name and Nature of Poetry, Cambridge University Press, Cam­
bridge, 1933. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press:
5. Harry Wain, A History of Preventive Medicine, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, I11., 1970. 6. H. Zinsser, Biographical Memoirs of Theobald Smith, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., 1936.
7. W. I. Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.; New York, 1950. Reprinted with permission of W. W. Norton and Professor Beveridge. A pa­perback edition has been published by Vintage Books (Random House. New York, undated).
8. P. B Medawar, The Art of the Soluble, Pelican, London, 1%9. Quoted with the permis­sion of Sir Peter Medawar.

SUGGESTED READING
Brewster Ghiselin, Ed., The Creative Process, University of California Press, Berkeley,1952. Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, Macmillan, New York, 1964.

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